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ABSTRACT
In article based on the materials of the American mass media the author constructs the autonomy process of Northeast China during the period 
preceding the Japanese-Chinese war of 1937-1945. The Japanese policy main stages on the creation of the semi-autonomous territories, the reasons 
interfering this plan implementation in whole, which it should be noted major confrontation in the Japan Cabinet, when the moderate politicians 
group supporting peaceful resolution of contradictions was headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the militarists group - The Minister of 
Army and the Command of Kwantung army supporting him, are established. Concluded that, first, Japan, being afraid of the negative international 
reaction, tried to solve the problem not military, but diplomatic and methods, and secondly, the Japanese policy on the continent was inconsistent and 
it was expressed in impossibility at an initial stage to achieve the status of the autonomy for five Chinese provinces and to declare the Autonomous 
Council of East Hebei, which under control territory covered only small part of one of the Chinese provinces. Creation of the Hopei-Chahar Political 
Council allowed both the Japanese, and the Chinese sides “to save face,” and the military campaign, which began in the summer of 1937, finished 
the transition process of the China northeast provinces under the Japan control through the creation of the quasi-state the Chinese Republic by the 
end of 1937. Invaders received in the order such tools as the circulation of the precious metals and drugs, finance, oil monopoly, customs points, etc., 
thereby having provided complete control over the region economy.
Keywords: Northeast China, Autonomy, Quasi-State, Economic Policy of Japan, Mass Media 
JEL Classifications: F13, N15, N25, N45
1. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 1932, the Japan’s external debt was estimated at 
$3.5 billion, the largest national debt in history, and the Finance 
Ministry prepared a management plan for the loan in the near future 
about $200 million to make ends meet at the end of the fiscal year 
(Another Bite of China?, 1932). The burden, heavy for Japan, an 
acute shortage of resources - all this indicated, on the one hand, 
riskiness of new military campaigns, on the other - possibility 
of replenishment of the state budget at the expense of resources 
of the occupied territories. Therefore, Japan was extremely 
interested in expanding its presence on the continent, and in 
the preparation of new economic resources and tools to ensure 
the survival. Representatives of the Japanese military command 
and diplomatic department began to establish in the Northeast 
China political formations that took on the nature of quasi-public 
nature, which would serve as a base for providing geo-political, 
military and economic objectives. One of these companies was 
Manzhouguo, which was to act as a model state in the Great Asian 
Co-prosperity Sphere, the other was Mengjiang - the financial and 
resource appendage, one more, economic and political, was to 
be not covered by the plans of the Northeast and eastern coastal 
provinces. Thus, in this process were involved territories of 
Chahar, Suiyuan, Shandong, Shanxi and Hopei, the eastern part 
of which has achieved autonomy, as well as the major economic 
centers Beiping, Tianjin and Qingdao.
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2. SOURCE BASE, METHODOLOGY AND 
CHRONOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 
RESEARCH
As the research, sources acted the materials of four mass media of 
the USA: New York Times, New York Post, Los Angeles Times, 
and Washington Post. Allocation of these editions is explained by 
that, first, they most often and fully covered events in the Northeast 
of China; secondly, had own correspondents in China; thirdly, not 
only established the facts, but also included analytical material 
and did the forecast of the events succession; fourthly, covered 
events immediately: In day of their commission or the next day.
In series of articles, two groups of material were allocated: 
Based on the news agencies data and the author’s material. As 
the information source for the first group of articles was the 
information of the largest international information and news 
agencies of Associated Press and United Press International. The 
second group of articles had the author, among whom were as 
the own correspondents working in the Northeast Asia, so the 
involved experts. So the most detailed process of the autonomy 
was covered by the correspondents Hallett Abend (1884-1955), 
after working in the Los Angeles Times was invited to work as 
a reporter for The New York Times in Beijing, and worked there 
until 1941; Archibald Steele (1903-1992), from 1932, he worked 
on the New York Times in China and received the 1950 George 
Polk Award for a series of articles about China for the publication 
of The New York Herald Tribune (Steele, 1992); Frank Tillman 
Durdin (1907-1998), who wrote for the New York Times and the 
Associated Press, he described one of the first atrocities of the 
Japanese military during the Sino-Japanese War and the Nanknin 
(Durdin, 1998) capture. As experts and observers involved George 
Ephraim Sokolsky (1893-1962), political adviser and a friend of 
Sun Yat-sen, who was considered one of the biggest experts in 
Asian issues after 14 years in China; Misselwitz Henry (Henry 
Misselwitz Papers, 1900-1953), who worked for 3 years as a 
correspondent in the publication of The Japan Advertiser, after 
during 2 years - As a foreign correspondent in China for the 
New York Times, and then - in the United Press; Edward Hunter 
(1903-1978), the correspondent of The New York Times and 
New York Post, one of the first reported the Japanese invasion 
of Manchuria (Hunter, 1978); and Ludwig Lore (1875-1942), 
correspondent of the New York Post (and later - New York Times), 
where his column Behind the Cables covered international events 
in the Northeast of China and in Inner Mongolia. Less known and 
less often meeting were the authors Hugh Byas, the journalist and 
the Japanologist working as the editor of the Japan Advertiser, and 
later as the correspondent London Times and New York Times, 
and also heading the Times department in Tokyo; observer of 
New York Times and expert in the field of the Chinese-Japanese 
relations Douglas Robertson; critic and bibliographer Katherine 
Woods; observer of the Washington Post Ben H. Miller; observer of 
the Washington Post and expert in the field of the Chinese-Japanese 
relations Mark J. Ginsbourg, etc.
The research methods included the media thematic monitoring, 
which allowed to trace publications appearing the foreign media 
of the 1930-1940s concerning the research subject; data collection, 
as a result was made the set of the most authoritative American 
media, the most complete and informative subject of research; the 
comparative method, which by comparing the mass media allowed 
to verify the data in the consistency of the scientific data that 
have been previously known, comparing them with the available 
material at our disposal; the discourse analysis, which managed 
to reach the understanding of the text plan, the set of ideas and 
concepts with which the author explained the events.
The study timeframe: 1935 (the year of the autonomy establishment 
in the eastern Hebei and the Hopei-Chahar Political Council) - 1938 
(the year of the absorption by the Chinese Republic Wang Kemin 
of the East Hebei and liquidation of the Hopei-Chahar Political 
Council).
The study geographical frames - The territory of the Chinese 
Republic provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shandong, Shanxi 
and Tianjin and Beiping cities.
3. INSTITUTIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE 
AUTONOMY PROCESS OF NORTHEAST 
CHINA
As the ideological inspirer of the Northeast China political map 
change, it is possible to consider the Major General Hayao Thad, 
commander of the Japanese troops in Northern China, who in this 
regard submitted the report to the considerations on September 
24, 1935, which expressed the idea of creating a new political 
organization in the north, economically independent from the 
Nanjing government. Thad’s offer quickly found an echo in 
military circles and among politicians and the autonomy process 
was launched.
On October 22, was triggered “casus belli,” when farmers of one 
of the Hopei demilitarized zone districts 40 miles from Beiping 
revolted and demanded the autonomy. Attempts to suppress the 
revolt were impossible under the terms of a truce Tanggu of 1933. 
Similar revolts broke out in the next days in some other districts, 
than it was succeeded to create the general feeling of vulnerability 
and autonomy as the only exit from a similar situation, disastrous 
for ordinary people.
In the middle of November, a sharp dumping of the Chinese 
money and the yen (New China State, 1935) purchase in 
total collapse of the Chinese currency that became a peculiar 
harbinger of the future changes, was marked. On November 
16, in the Tokyo press, it was declared that in 4 days five 
northern provinces will proclaim the autonomy (Ginsbourg, 
1936), but on November 20, the ambassador of Japan Akira 
Ariyosi led 4-h discussion with the general Chiang Kai-shek 
after which negotiations on the autonomy creation were stopped 
(By The United Press: Japan, Wavering, Halts Plan to Divide 
China, Curbs Military Chiefs, 1935), and the general Chang 
for consultations on this matter left for Tianjin (British Foil 
China Coup, 1935). Thus, the process of rapid autonomy of the 
Northeast had been suspended.
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In response, the Japanese side on November 24, 1935 made the 
formation of the anti-Communist Autonomous Council of East 
Hopei, which had jurisdiction over 22 districts. Most of them were 
in the demilitarized zone, which included the economic centers of 
the North - Beiping and Tianjin. At the head of the Council stood 
the General Yin Rugeng, whose administration had immediately 
acquired by the Japanese military advisors, and bought a fleet of 
17 Japanese bombers (East Hopei Area of Northern China Secedes 
in Coup, 1935). Despite the established friendly relations between 
the Hopei and Manchu governments, they had not been exchanged 
in future trade agreements and diplomatic representatives (Hopei 
to Pay Share on Loans to China, 1936), whose role was to carry 
out special envoys perceived as ambassadors, so in March 1937, 
was raised the question of retrocession. Chong Tongfu, one of the 
officers of the autonomy head, said that the Hopei government 
would not seek independence, but rather was intended to rid the 
country of the Kuomintang government (East Hopei Seeks to 
Upset Nanking, 1937). Although the Japanese side suggested 
that East Hopei would be returned under the control of Nanjing, 
but the Japanese-Chinese war broke out in the summer changed 
these plans, and eventually became part of the other quasi-
state territory - The Republic of China under the control of the 
Provisional Government headed by Wang Kemin.
On the day of the East Hopei autonomy creation, large disorders 
began in Tianjin. Propagandists who called themselves “Army of 
Self-preservation of Hopei” resisted attempts of the authorities to 
expel them from the management buildings on taxation and the 
Supreme Court. Protesters in hundreds passed across city streets 
earlier, disclosing the requirement of immediate introduction 
of self-government in Tianjin. The city appeared in confusion. 
Thousands of rich Chinese ran away to foreign concessions (By 
The Associated Press: Tientsin Fight Flares after Sector in Hopei is 
Decreed Free State, 1935) that significantly undermined economy 
and the cities, and all region. The U.S. Government treated with 
some fear to the movement for an autonomy in Northern China, 
which in general was perceived by it as policy of expansion of a 
Japanese sphere of influence to the South from the Great Wall. The 
protocol signed in 1901. China and 11 countries after suppression 
of Boxing revolt (By the Associated Press: Future Status of U.S. 
Troops in North China is Uncertain, 1935), the United States 
had an opportunity to have troops in Tianjin (two battalions 
of the 15th infantry division) and their status within the new 
mode remained not clear. However, the Japanese party perfectly 
understood danger of such participation and made everything 
possible that neither economic, nor military interests of the USA 
thus did not suffer.
Moreover, North of Tianjin, in Shangkhaiguan (Qingdao suburb), 
the Japanese began to concentrate the forces in an effort to 
maintain control in the aisle between the North China and 
Manchuria, and were ready to perform at Tianjin and Beiping 
(Japan to Invade China Tomorrow if New State is not Set Up 
in North, 1935). At the same time, there was information about 
the impending act of independence in the district of Qingdao, 
by analogy with the Eastern Hopei (Tokyo Ultimatum Reported 
in China, 1935). Thus, all the economically powerful centers 
of North China had rebelled against the central government, 
to deprive it of financial and resource revenues in favor of the 
Japanese side.
On November 30 by the negotiations results He Yingqin, the 
China’s Minister of War, with Doikhara: The Japanese reserved 
only two provinces (Ginsbourg, 1936), based on which the 
autonomy recognized by Nanjing, was created, and the Hebei 
territory had to be included in its structure (Japan Grips North 
China, 1935) that was confirmed on December 3, 1935 with the 
joint statement on creation of the Political Council with control 
powers in the Hopei and Chahar territory, which would receive 
the autonomous status, remaining as the Chinese Republic (China 
Bows to Demands, 1935) part. The new program concerning 
Northern China was met frostily and without special optimism 
from both sides, but got support both Japan and China (By the 
Associated Press: Nanking Offers Near Autonomy to North China, 
1935). On December 12, the Chinese central government issued 
the mandate authorizing creation of the Political Council and 
opening a door to domination in Northern China (China Gives 
Japan Reply, 1935). On December 18, official opening of Hebei-
Chahar Political Council took place. Action took place against 
student’s protest actions, disorders and strikes.
With the arrival of the general Sung Chzheyuang troops the 
new regime strengthened the positions and in Tianjin (By The 
Associated Press: Hopei-Chahar Regime Installed, 1935) where 
it replaced the former governor of Hopei Shan Chen. Under 
control to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, and actually - to 
the general Sung, territories played the extremely important 
strategic and economic role on crossing of trade ways from China 
to Mongolia and made 37 thousand square km, stretching from 
Jehol to Suiyuan’s border (Tokyo Ultimatum Reported in China, 
1936). However, the mode was only managed to be delayed, but 
not to prevent the war.
Following the incident on the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7 July 
13 the Japanese side put forward four demands, rejected Nanjing 
(Japanese Present Demands on China, 1937). The measures 
proposed by Sun Chzheyuang to prevent a military conflict, had 
not received approval from the official Nanjing, which led to 
full-scale war, which in the first 6 months had led to the seizure 
of 400 thousand sq. miles of Northern China, where 75 million 
people, and 65 thousand square miles in central China, where 40 
million people lived (Suiyuan Reports Mongolians’ Raids, 1938). 
The political outcome of the military events was the creation of a 
new quasi-state entity under the Republic of China name, the head 
of which had risen the Provisional Government, which creation 
was announced on December 13, 1937 after the occupation of 
the Forbidden City in Beiping. The plan of the Chinese-Japanese 
war termination by the section of China on five autonomous units, 
similar to the imperialists plans of the period of the Boxing revolt 
end was developed: Northern China with the capital in present 
Beiping represented by Provisional government; The Inner 
Mongolia under control of Dae Wang, heading now the Mongolian 
Federation with the capital in Hohhot; East China under control 
of the Japanese administration in Nanjing led by “The China 
reformed government”; The Central China at the management of 
the present Chinese government in Chongqing; The Southern China 
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under control of the provincial leaders coalition of Guangdong 
and Guangxi. Authoritative sources declared that Japan would 
be ready to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the mode 
in Chongqing if it accepts the plan of the section. The draft of the 
plan provides spheres of influence: Japan in Northern China and 
the Inner Mongolia; Germany in Shandong where it had economic 
positions before World War I; Britain in the valley of the lower 
Yangtze River, including Shanghai; France in the south of China 
(Tokio Even Willing to Give Chiang piece of his Own Country, 
1938). It Japanese military figures as if finished a certain stage 
of inclusion of Northern China in limits of a Japanese economic, 
political and military orbit. Northern China represented panacea 
for the Japan diseases - A raw materials source for textile both iron 
and steel works and a sales market of its goods. With receiving 
control practically over all North of China, Tokyo with pleasure 
would stop military operations. The country leaders clearly realized 
catastrophic consequences of war with weak economy of Japan, but 
at weak foreign policy department and under pressing of military 
strengthened aggression and as a result led Japan to World War II.
4. ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS OF THE 
NORTHEAST CHINA AUTONOMY
Unlike Manchuria, already occupied by the Japanese, the new 
territories were richer and densely populated, and the civil 
authorities of Japan were more seriously concerned world 
reaction to the events this time, seriously being afraid of possible 
international economic boycott of Japan (By The United Press: 
Japan, Wavering, Halts Plan to Divide China, Curbs Military 
Chiefs, 1935). The total capture of this area by the Japanese 
would have negative consequences for them around the world 
(Double-Dealing with China, 1935) therefore hardly the speech 
came about the autonomy, Great Britain declared that it had no 
intention to see penetration of Japan into the Pacific economic 
zone (British Foil China Coup, 1935) that Sir Samuel Hoare, the 
British foreign minister (By the Associated Press: World Warned 
that U.S. Frowns on Move for Autonomy, 1935), confirmed. The 
joint concern of the United States and Great Britain because of Far 
East events was stated in an exchange of views on the situation of 
Sir Ronald Lindsey, the British ambassador, and William Philipps, 
the State Deputy Secretary. Both countries had big investments 
and business interests that could be mentioned by the Japanese 
influence on economic and budgetary affairs in Northern China. 
However, being guided by the economic interests, the Japanese 
party tried to achieve a goal not by force of arms, but diplomacy. 
The got experience in Manzhouguo creation spoke about the need 
to work carefully not to upset with the aggression the normal 
economic relations in the region. It was declared that the safe zone 
creation, the financial system improvement, etc. (Japan Forces 
Rule on China Today, 1935) would be the main objective of the 
new political structure. Therefore, the new mode had to remain 
completely independent in financial affairs.
Now it is necessary to address to those tools and resources access 
to which provided the region autonomy.
First, it is precious metals turnover and, first of all, silver. The local 
population refused to follow the instruction of Nanjing on transfer 
of the savings to the national currency and continued to store silver 
in Japanese banks in Tianjin (Japan to Invade China Tomorrow if 
New State is Not Set Up in North, 1935) that as a result provoked 
uncontrollable surge in smuggling. The silver dollars turnover was 
forbidden by the law, and it was ordered to all Chinese to transfer 
the silver dollars to government banks at a course 1:1 in paper 
money of the new currency, but tens of the Japanese smugglers 
bought silver dollars from Chinese and paid for each of them on 
1.20 dollars in paper money taking into account that its real cost 
makes 1.60 dollars at the new course established for the Chinese 
currency. They could make it because were under protection of 
the status of extraterritoriality and could not be arrested by the 
Chinese, but only by the Japanese consular police (Abend, 1936).
Secondly, similar to Manchukuo in the economic cycle was 
included the drugs production. The opium distribution to the 
population occurred in large quantities through its monopoly: 
Drugs come true under the guise of legitimate medicines, and 
income, based on the silver was 2.2 million dollars annually (600 
Opium Bootleggers Put to Death in Chinese Province, 1935).
Taxes, customs and other duties, which did not come to Nanjing 
exchequer any more, but accumulated and used by the Japanese, 
became the third tool. At once after the announcement of the East 
Hopei autonomy Yin Rugeng ordered to the district government 
to keep all the incomes, which were usually transferred to the 
provincial government, thereby having cut off financial and 
economic streams of this territory from the central government. 
Began to go the income from the railroads, customs, telegraphs 
(East Hopei area of Northern China Secedes in Coup, 1935) and 
saline soils into the Council disposal. Thanks to the advantageous 
position, he gained a revenue in 18 million dollars and had army 
in 100 thousand people (Ginsbourg, 1936). The Hopei government 
seeking to repay the foreign loans which remained “in inheritance” 
from the central government actually legalized illicit schemes, 
justifying their providing with that in other ways quickly it was 
impossible to solve the objective: 5 customs posts that for half a 
year of independence collected 2 million dollars against 3 million 
dollars collected before the independence declaration (Hopei to 
Pay Share on Loans to China, 1936) were at its disposal that, 
naturally, was essential underestimation of the check points 
profitability and it transferred to hands of the Japanese the fourth 
tool - the goods smuggling.
The new customs duties that were 4 times less than that raised 
Nanjing were established. By this time, smuggled goods reached 
Shanghai and economy of this region appeared under the 
destabilization (Abend, 1936) threat, as well as all system of the 
Chinese taxation, trade and economy - because of the receipt of 
a huge number of the Japanese goods delivered through Dairen. 
Along all coast of Hopei, and also in the formed interval between 
regular Chinese customs in Shankhaiguan and Tianjin, small 
Japanese vessels with goods go to ports of Northern China, 
without paying in anything to the central customs, but paying the 
corresponding duties to officials of the local customs offices of East 
Hopei. The situation became so sharp that in the Shankhaiguan and 
Tianjin customs receipts was reduced by 40% while the income of 
East Hopei increased to three million Mexican dollars within the 
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last 3 months. At first these goods flooded the markets of Beijing 
and Tianjin, and then Japanese and Koreans began to transport 
these goods by rail, on channels by boats and trucks in the Province 
of Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Shaanxi and Gansu and even further.
The situation in this region, long time not causing concern of the 
international community, as a result forced the British authorities 
to start taking active actions. Sir Frederik Leith-Ross, the chief 
economic expert of the British government, expressed a protest in 
Tianjin to the General Consul of Japan Shigeru Kawagoe, against 
actions of the Japanese supporting smuggling and destroying the 
British business. In turn, the Japanese representative declared that 
smuggling is carried out from the British colony Hong Kong to 
the Canton. In addition, it was declared that the customs duties on 
silk, sugar and other subjects probably would be sharply lowered 
since May 1 of the current year to provide inflow of the Japanese 
goods to Northern China through East Hopei (Inner Mongolia 
Wavers, 1936).
September 01, 1936 the Hebei-Chahar Political Council decided 
to impose a special tax of one-eighth of the national tariffs on all 
goods imported smuggled through the former Hopei checkpoints 
south of Tianjin, after which all the goods for which paid fees, 
would be granted official protection. Thus was created the 
independent line customs posts along the coast of Hopei, where 
the goods fall in Chahar and later in China. This decision inflicted 
a heavy blow to the economy under the control of the Japan’s 
coastal areas, such as East Hopei, because until that time the 
Hopei Administration tariffs constituted one fourth of the national 
rate (Hopei “Legalizes” Smuggling, 1936), which is indirectly 
confirmed by the loyalty of General Sung to Nanjing.
As the fifth instrument acted the communications providing 
the movement of people, goods and information in the region. 
According to the Tanggu Truce conditions of 1933, the Japanese 
were granted the right for creation of airmail and granting to 
Southern Manchurian trains opportunity to use the Northern China 
railway system and service of passengers from the Manchurian 
cities following to Beiping, Tianjin and Kalgan (Gen. Sung Rejects 
Japan’s Demands, 1935). From the beginning of the autonomy 
movement, the Domeh agency reported that the new autonomy 
Council planned to take the national railroad in the demilitarized 
zone under the control that, according to some observers, could 
lead to emergence of the international complications (By the 
Associated Press: U.S. Apprehensive at Split Reported in North 
China State, 1935). However, everything went according to the 
peaceful scenario - The foreign powers interests did not suffer 
and the Beiping- Tianjin railroad passed under the Japanese army 
complete control, thus the Japanese troops (By the Associated 
Press: Future Status of U.S. Troops in North China is Uncertain, 
1935) occupied all the railway lines from Shankhaiguan on the 
border with Manchukuo towards Tianjin and Beiping (Abend, 
1936), as well as all important stations and knots that meant 
complete control over the region communications.
The Manchurian oil monopoly acted as the sixth instrument, to 
which Yin Rugeng declared accession in response to change of the 
customs policy and recent decisions of the Hebei-Chahar Political 
Council for the decrease in customs tariffs. The accession purpose 
was the restriction in the markets of the American and British 
oil companies that received the formal notice that they would be 
compelled to close the representations in Northern China after 
the oil turnover in Manchukuo is monopolized, and from now on 
would have to pay the import duty. As oil products were imported 
through Tianjin and for them high import tariffs to the Nanking 
Central Government at that time were already collected, it was 
supposed that the imposed surtaxes would paralyze oil business 
as it happened to oil, which delivery was carried out in East Hopei 
from Manchukuo, Korea and Japan by the Korean, Chinese and 
Japanese smugglers forces. The administration of East Hopei 
offered the companies opportunity to avoid difficulties if they 
carry out from now on deliveries not through Tianjin, which was 
in close proximity to the autonomy, and through Qinhuangdao, 
the town port in 100 miles to the North. In this case, suppliers 
would have to pay collecting only to East Hopei that made about 
one fourth from the Chinese customs payments (Double Tax on 
Oil Threatens in Hopei, 1936) amount.
And, at last, the own national bank creation and the own currency 
(Hopei to Pay Share on Loans to China, 1936) release had to 
become completion of all the economic and resource autonomy 
process. In the fall of 1936, it was declared the preparation 
completion for opening of the State bank of East Hopei that had 
to take place in February 1937 (Student Groups Banned, 1936). 
However, here to be in time it did not turn out. With monthly 
lateness, in the middle of March, East Hopei stopped the Chinese 
banknotes circulation in the territory and created the own currency 
system. The general fund made the sum of 26 million dollars 
from which 5 million were prepared and started in turn at once. 
Banknotes were printed, and coins are rapped out in Japan. It was 
supposed that the banknotes would be provided with the Bank of 
East Hopei, but the Chosen Bank (the Bank of Korea) assumed this 
function. New coins had a stamp with date “The 26th year of the 
Chinese Republic,” thereby confirming the Japanese assurance that 
East Hopei continued to remain an integral part of China, but did 
not want to have nothing in common with the present government 
in Nanjing (Puppet Region Cuts Another Chinese Tie, 1937). The 
presence reason on coins of a mention of the Chinese Republic 
became clear some days when there was the information that Japan 
intends to redeem situation of East Hopei as a part of China later, 
saying to that such was the price of economic cooperation with 
China. Wang Chonghui, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Chinese Republic, told about the informal Japanese economic 
mission, which returned to Japan from China recently, though did 
not reach desirable results. Members of the Japanese economic 
mission were presented by large executives - heads of the Japanese 
trade and industrial organizations and had the opportunity freely 
and frankly to exchange opinions with the Chinese executives. In 
April, the similar mission organized by the Japanese government 
invitation with the Sung Chzheyuang participation left from 
Northern China to Japan (Gen. Sung, 55, Dead, 1940). It could 
promote creation of the favorable atmosphere for the solution of 
the available Chinese-Japanese problems, though it was assumed 
that the Chinese-Japanese economic problems are secondary in 
relation to settlement of the political problems and that as soon 
as the Japanese army manages to settle political affairs, economic 
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problems decides by itself (East Hopei Seeks to Upset Nanking, 
1937). However, military overestimated the opportunities and it 
was not succeeded to reach wished them.
5. CONCLUSION
At a certain stage of the Japanese-Chinese conflict development 
Japan was succeeded to achieve the goal - The creation of large, 
economically independent territory under the protégés control 
that would provide the military budget replenishment and would 
form the presence basic base on the continent. The Japanese 
party achieved the objective without the international collisions 
and active military operations, without having lost any soldier, 
and not violating any letter of the international law of that time. 
Reasonable arrangement and distribution of forces along the Great 
Wall, profound knowledge of the Chinese conditions and ability 
to order in the field conditions, and also that the Kwantung Army 
was always ready to any emergency situation, allowed the Japanese 
to achieve desirable result and to receive the whole tool kit by 
means of which it controlled the region economy. It was succeeded 
with the beginning of open military opposition of Japan to unite 
all autonomous territories under the uniform political structure 
control, and China was put in position of the occupied country.
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